Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy > 자유게시판

• 목록
• 답변
• 글쓰기
• 게시판 리스트 옵션
  • 수정
  • 삭제

In fact, later in the Treatise, Hume states that necessity is defined by both, either as the constant conjunction or as the mental inference, that they are two different senses of necessity, and Hume, at various points, identifies both as the essence of connection or power. We use direct observation to draw conclusions about unobserved states of affairs. An influential argument, the Problem’s skeptical conclusions have had a drastic impact on the field of epistemology. Here is the description of a capital game which can be played in an open field where there is no cover. As causation, at base, involves only matters of fact, Hume once again challenges us to consider what we can know of the constituent impressions of causation. Hume does not hold that, having never seen a game of billiards before, we cannot know what the effect of the collision will be. This is to posit a far stronger claim than merely having an idea of causation. We cannot claim direct experience of predictions or of general laws, but knowledge of them must still be classified as matters of fact, since both they and their negations remain conceivable. A safety must meet the requirements of Rule 1.19, Legal Shot, or it is a foul.

2. If the cue ball is pocketed or driven off the table, or the requirements of the opening break are not met, it is a foul, and the incoming player has cue ball in hand anywhere on the table. The 8-ball may be part of such a combination if it is not the first ball contacted by the cue ball. However, Blackburn has the first as giving the "contribution of the world" and the latter giving the "functional difference in the mind that apprehends the regularity." (Blackburn 2007: 107) However, this is not the only way to grant a nonequivalence without establishing the primacy of one over the other. Ott 2009: 239) This way of dismissing the nonequivalence of the two definitions becomes more problematic, however, when we realize that Hume does not make the distinction between natural and philosophical relations in the Enquiry, yet provides approximately the same two definitions. There are several interpretations that allow us to meaningfully maintain the distinction (and therefore the nonequivalence) between the two definitions unproblematically.

For these reasons, Hume’s discussion leading up to the two definitions should be taken as primary in his account of causation rather than the definitions themselves. Whether the Problem of induction is in fact separable from Hume’s account of necessary connection, he himself connects the two by arguing that "…the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other." (EHU 4.6; SBN 27) Here, How to Play 8 Ball Billiards Hume invokes the account of causation explicated above to show that the necessity supporting (B) is grounded in our observation of constant conjunction. Stathis Psillos, for instance, views Hume’s inductive skepticism as a corollary to his account of necessary connection. It is therefore not entirely clear how Hume views the relationship between his account of necessity and the Problem. Of the common understanding of causality, Hume points out that we never have an impression of efficacy. If you have an odd number left (a number that cannot be divided by 2), then darts must be thrown to reduce the score to an even number, before throwing at a double. In considering the foundations for predictions, however, we must remember that, for Hume, only the relation of cause and effect gives us predictive power, as it alone allows us to go beyond memory and the senses.

Causation is a relation between objects that we employ in our reasoning in order to yield less than demonstrative knowledge of the world beyond our immediate impressions. Another method is to cash out the two definitions in terms of the types of relation. For instance, the Copy Principle, fundamental to his work, has causal implications, and Hume relies on inductive inference as early as T 1.1.1.8; SBN 4. Hume consistently relies on analogical reasoning in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion even after Philo grants that the necessity of causation is provided by custom, and the experimental method used to support the "science of man" so vital to Hume’s Treatise clearly demands the reliability of causal inference. We may therefore now say that, on Hume’s account, to invoke causality is to invoke a constant conjunction of relata whose conjunction carries with it a necessary connection. Thus, objections like: Under a Humean account, the toddler who burned his hand would not fear the flame after only one such occurrence because he has not experienced a constant conjunction, are unfair to Hume, as the toddler would have had thousands of experiences of the principle that like causes like, and could thus employ resemblance to reach the conclusion to fear the flame.